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Abstract: The development of electronic payment instruments and their online availability constitute important parts of the development of 
the EU payments market. Individual states adopt different approaches towards interpretation (legal aspects) and types of electronic payment 
instruments. To encourage sustainable payment services, minimize possible threats, and create favourable conditions for the development 
of new payment instruments, legislators adopt general legal acts stipulating the legal status of electronic payment instruments. However, 
the actual interpretation of payment instruments is often narrowed in legal practice, and does not cover payment instruments newly 
introduced to the market. A new insight into electronic payment instruments corresponding to the latest trends in the market is important in 
criminal law as well, because crimes related to the use of a payment instrument are common and difficult to investigate. In view of recent 
changes in payment services (the new Payment Services Directive in 2019), the norms of criminal law stipulating liability for the illegal 
disposal of electronic payment instruments must reflect circumstances predetermined by today’s technological developments. In terms of 
criminal law, a technologically neutral conception of the payment instrument is necessary, to include a wider range of payment instruments 
that differ considerably from conventional personalized payment cards. The aim of this article is, therefore, to demonstrate that the current 
regulation of the Criminal Code of Lithuania lags behind the development of payment instruments, and in order to avoid excessive 
criminalization it is proposed to narrow the application of Article 214 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code. 
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The first attempt to define an electronic payment instrument was made in 1988 by European Commission 
Recommendation 88/590/EEC concerning payment systems, and in particular the relationship between cardholder 
and card issuer. The recommendation aimed not only at defining, but also at legally regulating the new payment 
services provided in the electronic environment. The recommendation also associated electronic payment 
instruments with the Payment device, defined as “a card or some other means enabling its user to effect 
operations, such as: 
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a) electronic payment involving the use of a card, in particular at point of sale [emphasis added], 
b) the withdrawing of banknotes, the depositing of banknotes and cheques, and connected operations, at 
electronic devices, such as cash dispensing machines and automated teller machines [emphasis 
added].” 
 
As the market for electronic payment was developing rapidly, the European Commission issued Recommendation 
97/489/EC on 30 July 1997, concerning transactions by electronic payment instruments and in particular the 
relationship between the issuer and holder (hereafter – Commission Recommendation of 1997). The latter 
recommendation also included innovative electronic payment instruments that allowed the digital storage of the 
monetary value. This was the first attempt to legally regulate new payment instruments by distinguishing them 
from conventional remote access instruments (debit and credit cards) used to make electronic payment orders to 
the credit institution. The Commission Recommendation of 1997 defined an electronic payment instrument as: an 
instrument enabling its holder to effect transactions including cash withdrawals by means of an electronic 
payment instrument and the loading (and unloading) of an electronic money instrument, at devices such as cash 
dispensing machines and automated teller machines and at the premises of the issuer or an institution who is 
under contract to accept the payment instrument. 
 
Gradually, the market has adopted new payment instruments that fall outside the limits of the present legal 
regulation because of the specific range of the services they grant (European Central Bank, 2002). The 
functioning of traditional payment instruments, including credit cards, credit transfer, debit instruments (direct 
debit and debit cards), and electronic vouchers, has been carefully regulated by legal acts. Meanwhile, modern 
technologies offer new payment instruments, including prepaid cards, mobile billing, and e-money. 
 
Until 2007, when the Directive of the European Council 2007/64/EC (Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC; 
hereafter – PSD 2007) was adopted, the concept of an electronic payment instrument was defined only by the 
Commission Recommendation of 1997. The amendment of the provisions of the EU Recommendations of 1997, 
transposed into the Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC, led to a new definition of an electronic payment 
instrument that included both the existing and newly developed electronic payment products. A payment 
instrument was technologically neutrally defined in Article 4 paragraph 23 of the Directive 2007/64/EC (Directive 
2007) as: “any personalised device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service user and the 
payment service provider and used by the payment service user in order to initiate a payment order”. This 
definition therefore comprises a wider range of electronic payment instruments. Prior to 2007, problems used to 
arise regarding the due identification and acknowledgment of electronic payment instruments stored in 
workstations (direct non-autonomous electronic payment instruments) as a means of payment, whereas the new 
concept of an electronic payment instrument extended the definition to include all electronic instruments 
(autonomous electronic payment instruments and direct non-autonomous electronic instruments). Lithuania first 
defined an electronic payment instrument in 2003 by amending its Payment Law as follows:  
Electronic payment instruments are remote access instruments of payment and electronic money. The user of 
an electronic payment instrument (hereinafter referred to as User) is a client of a credit institution granted an 
electronic payment instrument by the credit institution. Remote access instruments of payment are defined as a 
means enabling the user to give electronic instructions to the credit institution on the disposal of funds in their 
account in the credit institution (Law on Payments, 2003). 
 
The new concept of the payment instrument specifies that the instrument may be personalized, i.e. linked to a 
person, and may be used for remote identity verification by the bank or electronic payment service provider. 
Another important aspect of the concept is that the payment instrument may entail certain procedures. No physical 
item (a card or an equivalent media) is needed to make a payment – a user name, a password, or a variable 
password may be enough for identity verification. Such extension of the meaning of payment instrument helped to 
deal with a previously unresolved problem – whereas formerly payment instruments were understood only as 
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tangible media, such as credit cards and the like, now such instruments may well include biometric data or a 
mobile phone application subject to party agreement and the availability of relevant technologies. The best and 
most widely used example of successfully agreed procedures in electronic payment is e-banking, where the user 
name, the password or generated variable password, and special mobile phone applications or data stored in the 
phone constitute conventional procedures to initiate and complete payments.  
 
The contemporary Law on Payments of the Republic of Lithuania defines a payment instrument in line with the 
principle of technological neutrality with no discrimination of issuers (including all financial institutions along 
with credit institutions). “‘Payment instrument’ means any personalised device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed 
between the payment service user and the payment service provider and used by the payment service user in order 
to initiate a payment order” (Law on Payments, 2003). This definition has been originally transposed from the 
new Payment Directive 2015/2366 (hereafter – PSD2). The preamble of Directive PSD2 states that the existing 
and prospective market players should be granted equal business conditions so as to extend opportunities for new 
players to enter the market and ensure high-level user security in the use of payment services within the entire 
European Union. Equal conditions are likely to contribute to the efficiency of the entire payment system, grant a 
better choice and transparency of payment services, and increase user trust in the payments market.  
 
Personalized devices mentioned in the definition of payment instruments are closely linked to personalized safety 
features, which are understood as data to be used for user authentication and agreed to by the payment service 
provider and the user. These features may include a wide range of forms, such as PIN codes, biometric data, or 
variable algorithm generated values. The PSD2 Directive also specifies the importance of personalized safety 
features, stating that they have to meet the payment-associated risk level. It is also important to secure conditions 
for the development of available user-friendly payment instruments, including low risk payments (e.g. contactless 
payments) that are subject to standard security exceptions independently on whether the payment is done by card 
or by smart phone. The PSD2 Directive emphasizes the safe use of personalized safety features to reduce the risks 
of theft and malicious practice. In that sense, user trust in measures granting confidentiality and in the integrity of 
personalized safety features is essential. Such measures typically include encryption systems based on the use of 
personal devices, such as card readers or mobile phones, that may be used by the service provider to send 
encryption data, e.g. text messages or e-mail messages (PSD2 preamble). It is the personal user devices that have 
actually extended the conventional understanding of the payment instrument, as the user is free to choose the 
device to store personalized safety features on (data necessary for contactless payment, login code generators, and 
electronic signature certificates). It has to be presumed that the use of identity verification codes is compatible 
with the user’s duties concerning their payment instruments and personalized safety features (PSD2 preamble). 
The fact that the Directive associates possession of personalized devices with certain duties of the user is of great 
importance. Apart from the requirement for the device holder to use their payment device in accordance with the 
terms and conditions regulating issuance and use of the payment device (which must be objective, non-
discriminatory, and proportionate), the user has two major duties (Law on Payments, 2003): 
a) The user must immediately report the loss, theft, unauthorized use, or misappropriation of the payment 
device to the issuer of the payment service provider or an authorized representative of the service 
provider.   
b) On receipt of the payment device, the user must take all possible actions to protect their personalized 
safety data. The latter, however, constitutes the major challenge to the developer of payment instruments 
as the user typically prefers simplicity to safety (weak PIN codes, ignored safety requirements, sharing 
with other people).   
 
Compliance with the latter requirement may protect against unauthorized use of the payment instrument. To meet 
the requirement, the EU’s technological safety standards had to be changed. One of the key solutions was the 
introduction of the EMV standard in payment cards. EMV is an international technical standard developed by 
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Europay, MasterCard, and VISA in 1999. The standard sets safety requirements for any operations performed by 
chip payment cards and chip card devices, including chip card readers, payment terminals, and automated teller 
machines. The goal of the EMV standard is to unify the requirements independently across the payment system. 
The standard is now managed by EMVCo consortium. The EU Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) project set the 
requirement for all payment cards issued within the EU to have an EMV standard IC chip along with the magnetic 
strip on 1 January 2011. The goal of the SEPA initiative is to develop a single area for payments in euros, with no 
discrimination between national and international payments. Within the SEPA area, credit transfer and direct 
debit operations in euros are subject to standard payment schemes and the application of uniform terms, rights, 
and obligations. One of the instruments envisaged by SEPA includes payment cards with integrated EMV 
standard IC chips. The magnetic strip was deemed unsafe because of the risk of theft of the data necessary for 
payment initiation stored in the magnetic strip, which could be read without the holder’s awareness (by means of 
various fraudulent schemes). The EMV standard requires a mandatory PIN code to approve payment operations, 
thus enforcing the user’s duty to protect their data. The EMV standard also provides for the use of contactless 
NFC (near field communication) payment cards, where data necessary for payment initiation are transferred by a 
radio signal. To improve user convenience, small value payments may be performed with no PIN requirement. 
Individual countries and financial institutions are free to set limits on transaction sums in view of their customer 
behaviour and available statistics. The limits typically vary from €12 to €47 (Statista, 2019).  NFC payments still 
retain certain risks, but the user is given the option to choose whether to activate such payments or not. The PSD2 
Directive aims to extend the use of user-friendly payment instruments and encourage the development of easy-
access user-friendly payment instruments made for low-risk transactions by means of smart phone applications. 
Generally speaking, a payment instrument is no longer just a payment card or a batch of personalized features 
necessary to log in to e-banking. In the modern world, payment instruments may already be found in a great deal 
of personal electronic gadgets. The use of smart phones as payment instruments has been rapidly growing, and 
they have already become commonplace as payment instruments. Europe has seen an upsurge in wearable 
payments (a wearable device, for example a ring, bracelet, or smart watch, that has Near-Field Communication 
(NFC) capabilities). Having linked these items to your debit or credit card, you can pay in the same contactless 
way (Wearable payments, 2019). Thus, payment instruments have already come to include bracelets, rings, smart 
watches, or key chains. Surveys reveal that sums paid by means of wearable payments are set to soar in the near 
future. According to market research and consulting firm Reports and Data, the global wearable device market is 
expected to grow from $312 billion in 2018 to over $1.1 trillion in 2026 (MasterCard, 2019). 
 
Essentially, payment instruments may not be identified solely as conventional payment cards or remote access 
instruments, as there is a much wider range of personalized devices in the market that may have the attributes of 
payment instruments and may be used for payment initiation and completion. In terms of criminal law, it is very 
important to credibly identify such instruments and their use in order to duly qualify payment associated criminal 
offences. 
 
Methodologically, this research focuses on the regulation of electronic payment instruments in the EU and 
Lithuania, and also on the understanding of payment instruments in Lithuanian criminal law. The authors use 




2. The Concept of Payment Instruments in Criminal Law 
 
The requirement of criminal law to clearly define the content of payment instruments should be primarily 
associated with the principles of protection of legitimate expectations, legal certainty, and legal security. It is the 
aspiration for legal certainty and clarity that implies certain mandatory requirements for legal regulation: “it has to 
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be clear and cohesive, legal norms must be stated clearly and contain no ambiguities” (rulings of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 13 May 2010, 22 June 2009, 25 December 2008, 26 January 
2004 and 30 May 2003). However, in view of the progress and trends in technological development, criminal 
legal regulation also has to be timely, and the understanding of payment instruments has to correspond to changes 
in technologies. Having in mind the aforementioned, criminal law needs a concept of payment instruments that is 
sustainable and, at the same time, reflects modern trends in the financial sector. The harmonization of these two 
aspects is probably the major issue in safeguarding a cohesive interaction between law (including criminal law) 
and technologies, i.e. the enforcement of the key provisions of criminal liability alongside the dynamic 
interpretation of legal norms concerning technological development. Also, interaction between law and 
technologies at the legislative level should reflect an idea that “[l]aw develops in an evolutionary way, not in a 
revolutionary way” (Schellekens, 2006).  
 
The need to decide which items contain elements of payment instruments in criminal law is attributable to the fact 
that Lithuania’s Criminal Code imposes criminal liability for the illegal disposal of such instruments. For the sake 
of accuracy, is has to be mentioned that Lithuania’s Criminal Code criminalizes the illegal disposal of: 1) an 
electronic payment instrument; 2) a misappropriated electronic payment instrument or the data of the identity 
verification device of the owner of such a payment instrument sufficient to initiate a financial transaction; and 3) 
an instrument (or instruments) of crime – technical equipment, software, or other means directly intended or 
tailored to fake or forge electronic payment instruments or their parts. Although the aforementioned elements of 
crime are included in Article 214 of the Criminal Code as alternatives, they are all, be they data or instruments 
(tools) of crime, directly related to an electronic payment instrument. An exact definition of the content of a 
payment instrument is only possible after the identification of what should be deemed an electronic payment 
instrument in criminal law. The earlier version of Article 214 of the Criminal Code imposed criminal liability for 
the illegal disposal of fake payment instruments. The provision was changed in 2007 to entrench a much wider 
concept of an electronic payment instrument, as for a long time the concept of an electronic payment instrument 
pivoted on Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of 
non-cash means of payment (hereafter – Decision 2001/413/JHA). Scientific sources used to maintain that 
payment instruments had certain features: “a material expression and a special purpose – non-cash payments, 
transfer of money or monetary sums” (Piesliakas & Dvilaitis, 2008). Obviously, this interpretation was similar to 
the definition provided by Decision 2001/413/JHA, defining a payment instrument as “a corporeal instrument, … 
enabling, by its specific nature, alone or in conjunction with another (payment) instrument, the holder or user to 
transfer money or monetary value …, which is protected against imitation or fraudulent use …” (Article 1, 
paragraph (a)). However, today’s interpretation of a payment instrument in terms of criminal law has to be made 
in view of the fact that the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2019/713 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on 17 April 2019, on combating fraud and the counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA (hereafter – Directive 2019/713). As the scope of application of the 
directive also includes non-corporeal payment instruments (paragraph 15 of the Preamble), the issue of the 
content of the electronic payment instrument becomes of key importance. 
 
As Directive 2019/713 states, “[r]ecent years have brought not only an exponential increase in the digital 
economy, but also a proliferation of innovation in many areas, including payment technologies” (Preamble 
paragraph 6). New payment technologies are closely related to new payment devices, which become more and 
more accessible to a massive number of users, grant new opportunities for financial operations, and make the 
process of payment less complex. As a wide range of activities move into the electronic environment, the impact 
of new technologies becomes inevitable. However, the rapid development of payment technologies is inseparable 
from risks emerging in the electronic environment. As “crime follows opportunity” (Clough, 2011), the electronic 
environment faces a variety of types of fraud involving the use of modern payment instruments. One of the ways 
to combat fraud is by inflicting criminal liability for the illegal disposal of electronic payment instruments. 
However, in view of constant technological development, it is essential to regularly reassess whether the present 
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criminalization of illicit acts is up-to-date, and whether the existing legal norms can still be applied to the types of 
fraud newly emerging in the electronic environment. This issue may also be found in Directive 2019/713 which, 
inter alia, states that “[n]ew payment technologies involve the use of new types of payment instruments, which, 
while creating new opportunities for consumers and businesses, also increase opportunities for fraud. 
Consequently, the legal framework must remain relevant and up-to-date against the background of those 
technological developments” (Preamble paragraph 6). Also, a further insight may be made by assessing the 
prospects of the development of payment instruments and producing estimations as to whether the notions used in 
Lithuania's Criminal Code will be applicable to future payment opportunities, which may be forecast in view of 
trends in the development of payment technologies. Specifically, the question concerns notions describing the 
content of criminal acts defined in Article 214 of Lithuania’s Criminal Code in terms of their applicability to 
electronic payment instruments emerging in the financial sector. 
 
Presumably, the widespread criminalization of the illegal disposal of electronic payment instruments in Lithuania 
is predetermined, inter alia, by the fact that – implied already in the title of Chapter XXXII of the Criminal Code 
– such disposal is deemed a serious threat to the national financial system. Specifically, as the judicial practice 
shows, this threat is to the regulation of the use and disposal of electronic payment instruments intended for non-
cash payments (Lithuanian Supreme Court ruling of 24 March 2020 in criminal case No. 2K-77-1073/2020). 
Justification for the gravity of the crime of illegal disposal of electronic payment instruments may also be based 
on the provisions of Directive 2019/713, which states that “[f]raud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment are threats to security, as they represent a source of income for organised crime and are therefore 
enablers for other criminal activities such as terrorism, drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings” 
(Preamble paragraph 1). Since the financial system, as an intermediate link to access and invest in funds, involves 
financial intermediaries, it is equally important to ensure that “[f]raud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment also represent obstacles to the digital single market, as they erode consumers’ trust and cause direct 
economic loss” (Preamble, paragraph 2). In describing the threats posed by the illegal disposal of electronic 
payment instruments, it is also important to consider a wider range of institutions involved in the functioning of 
financial markets, instead of associating financial intermediaries merely with financial institutions, i.e. banks. For 
example, Gai and Kapadia (2019) stated in their analysis of networks and systemic risk in the financial system 
that “it is likely to become increasingly important to examine network effects across the wider financial system, 
encompassing insurance companies, investment funds, and other non-bank financial intermediaries”. The wider 
interpretation of the notion of a financial intermediary can also be seen in the judicial practice of Lithuania’s 
courts. For example, in one of the reviewed criminal cases the court stated that the accused illegally disposed of a 
misappropriated filling station credit card along with the PIN number required to carry out financial operations. 
As the court identified the illegal disposal of a misappropriated electronic payment instrument along with data of 
the owner’s identity verification, the act was qualified as a crime as described in Article 214 of the Criminal Code 
(Order of District Court of Klaipėda, Chamber of Klaipėda City of 21 September 2018 in criminal case No. 1-
937-795/2018). Lithuania’s judicial practice includes cases where an act was qualified as a crime, as described in 
Article 214 of the Criminal Code, as the accused illegally disposed of a payment card issued by an electronic 
payment institution licenced by Lithuania’s bank along with login data sufficient to initiate a financial transaction 
(Ruling of District Court of Tauragė, Chamber of Šilutė of 4 October 2018 in criminal case No. 1-512-733/2018). 
The judicial practice also includes cases where reference to the same article of the Criminal Code was made to 
qualify the illegal disposal of payment instrument verification data, i.e. login data of an illegally opened account 
in an electronic payment service company, sufficient to initiate a financial transaction (Ruling of District Court of 
Vilnius City of 11 January 2018 in criminal case No. 1-371-1034/2018). 
 
In defining the concept of a payment instrument in criminal law, an important factor is the principle of 
technological neutrality. The implementation of the principle, including in criminal law, may help to avoid the 
limitations that may arise in the application of legal norms due to certain technological aspects involved: “[t]he 
benefit of technological neutrality based on the rationale of sustainability would be that it makes regulation ‘time-
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proof’” (van der Haar, 2007, p. 23). Having analysed various aspects of the aforementioned principle, it becomes 
obvious that the requirement to maintain technological neutrality can only be met by properly stating the content 
of the notion. As I. M. van der Haar states, “lawmakers would need to adhere to a more functional definition, 
meaning a definition solely relying on functional concepts, thereby leaving out all references to technologies” 
(2007, p. 23). The importance of functions and the most common features – not the specific types of technologies 
– have also been emphasized by P. Ohm: “[t]ech-neutral provisions refer to technology in general, vague, open-
textured terms that specify purposes, effects, functions, and other general characteristics” (2010). In interpreting 
electronic payment instruments in criminal cases of the illegal disposal of electronic payment instruments, in line 
with the principle of technological neutrality, the priority should be given to the intent of the instrument and the 
functions of the technology chosen for financial operations instead of the technology itself. Such a priority would 
allow safeguarding a sufficiently sustainable understanding of an electronic payment instrument and help to avoid 
possible loopholes in criminal law caused by changes in technology. The importance of technological neutrality in 
view of the development and dissemination of technologies is also hinted at in Directive 2019/713. This Directive 
notes that modern payment instruments granting the user new opportunities may be used for fraudulent purposes; 
therefore “the legal framework must remain relevant and up-to-date against the background of those technological 
developments, on the basis of a technology-neutral approach” (Preamble, paragraph 6). The provisions of the 
preamble of the Directive reflect, inter alia, the notions included in Directive 2019/713. For instance, a non-cash 
payment instrument is defined as “a non-corporeal or corporeal protected device, object or record, or a 
combination thereof, other than legal tender, and which, alone or in conjunction with a procedure or a set of 
procedures, enables the holder or user to transfer money or monetary value, including through digital means of 
exchange” (Article 2, paragraph (a)). As can be seen from Directive 2019/713, a non-cash payment instrument is 
described by means of abstract, technologically neutral notions such as device, object, or record, primarily 
focusing on the features’ indication of their intent and functions – the instrument has to enable the holder or user 
to transfer money or monetary value. As digital economics rapidly develops and introduces more and more 
innovations, the definition of payment instruments given in Directive 2019/713 has envisaged opportunities to 
apply it not only to existing payment technologies, but to prospective ones as well.  
 
The concept of an electronic payment instrument is not explicitly specified in the Lithuanian Criminal Code, 
leaving the interpretation of its content at the discretion of the courts tasked with the responsibility of deciding in 
their hearings whether an illegally disposed instrument contains features of an electronic payment instrument. 
Having reviewed the judicial practice of the Lithuanian Supreme Court, it becomes clear that one of the sources 
helping to identify the content of a payment instrument in criminal hearings is Lithuania’s Law on Payments. For 
example, the Lithuanian Supreme Court ruling of 24 March 2020 in criminal case No. 2K-77-1073/2020 notes 
that “‘payment instrument’ means any personalised device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed between the 
payment service user and the payment service provider and used by the payment service user in order to initiate a 
payment order”, which is fully compliant with the frequently referred to provisions of the Law on Payments. It is 
equally important that such an understanding of a payment instrument in criminal law fully complies with the 
requirements of the principle of neutrality, applicable, inter alia, to the terminology used in legal acts. Here, it is 
necessary that “[technologically] neutral regulation appears to have three main aims: futureproofing, online and 
offline equivalence, and encouraging the development and uptake of the regulated technology” (Reed, 2007). 
 
To decide if the aforementioned technologically neutral concept of a payment instrument and its data helps to deal 
with practical problems likely to arise in the qualification of crimes, a survey of Lithuania's judicial practice has 
been conducted. The survey summarized 158 rulings of district courts in the period of 2018–2020, which stated 
that the accused committed, inter alia, a criminal act as described in Article 214 of the Criminal Code, besides 
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Table 1. Object of the crime as described in Article 214 of the Criminal Code in Lithuania’s judicial practice 
Object of the crime Identified cases Percentage (%) 
A misappropriated genuine corporeal electronic payment instrument 106 67 
Misappropriated non-corporeal payment instrument verification data, sufficient 
to initiate a financial operation 
41 26 
Data of a misappropriated genuine electronic payment instrument, sufficient to 
initiate a financial operation 
7 4 
A fake corporeal electronic payment instrument 3 2 
Possession of technical equipment and software intended or tailored to fake 
electronic payment instruments. 
1 1 
Source: the authors’ research 
 
The results of the survey reveal that the vast majority of cases of illegal disposal of electronic payment 
instruments are attributable to misappropriation and possession of a genuine electronic payment instrument 
(67%). The disposal of misappropriated bank cards (including contactless) was probably most typical However, 
when considering whether an electronic payment instrument as specified in Article 214 of the Criminal Code may 
be of a non-corporeal nature, it has to be noted that the survey revealed several cases of the illegal disposal of 
payment instrument verification data of the owner of a misappropriated non-corporeal electronic payment 
instrument, sufficient to initiate a financial operation (26%). Such cases were mostly associated with the illegal 
acquisition of data sufficient to perform a financial operation in e-banking. As Lithuania’s Supreme Court states, 
such data constitute personal electronic identity data, provided by the bank under a bank account contract 
stipulating the terms and conditions of the use of the account (Lithuania’s Supreme Court ruling of 10 October 
2013 in criminal case No. 2K-389/2013). Since the initiation of financial operations in e-banking is of a specific 
nature, criminal cases of the latter category relate to the illegal disposal of identity verification codes and login 
passwords (for example: the ruling of District Court of Kaunas, Chamber of Kaunas of 6 February 2019 in 
criminal case No. 1-576-573/2019; the ruling of District Court of Vilnius City of 5 March 2018 in criminal case 
No. 1-184-270/2018; and the ruling of District Court of Alytus, Chamber of Druskininkai of 6 September 2018 in 
criminal case No. 1-982-182/2018). It also has to be noted that the provisions of Article 214 of the Criminal Code 
state that payment instrument verification data (including e-banking data) are deemed to be objects of the crime 
described in the same article of the code only in cases where they are sufficient to initiate a financial operation. 
Another aspect of the aforementioned criminal cases that is important for our analysis is that courts allow a wider 
approach to the concept of an electronic payment instrument by attributing to it the potential to have more than 
merely material characteristics. Lithuania’s Supreme Court notes in its judicial practice that “all monetary 
operations are carried out in e-banking by means of human-written computer programs.  Instead of direct liaison, 
the client communicates with the bank via an electronic system. The system is designed to receive instructions 
and perform operations only when correct user identification codes are submitted" (Ruling of Lithuania’s 
Supreme Court of 9 October 2001 in criminal case No. 2K-682/2001). The way financial operations are 
performed predetermines the absence of any links between the use of electronic channels (e.g. the internet of e-
bank) and the corporeal payment instrument. In such cases, the notion of an electronic payment instrument also 
entails “an electronic system of rendering bank services via the Internet along with certain procedures applicable 
for payment initiation and agreed between by the payment service provider and the payment service user” 
(Marcinauskaitė, 2019). As Laurinaitis notes, the best example “illustrating procedures agreed in electronic 
payment and widely used in Lithuania is e-banking, where a user name, a password and password cards constitute 
conventional procedures of payment initiation and completion” (2015). A similar interpretation may also be 
observed in the judicial practice that has been reviewed. For example, in one criminal case the court arrived at the 
conclusion that, apart from other punishable acts, the accused illegally acquired and kept electronic payment 
instrument verification data, namely e-banking login data. Such data were considered by the court to be payment 
instrument verification data attributable to an electronic payment instrument – the e-banking system of the 
specific bank – and therefore sufficient to initiate a financial operation (ruling of District Court of Kaunas, 
Chamber of Kaunas of 2 August 2018 in criminal case No. 1-2663-917/2018).  
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Analysis of the judicial practice demonstrates that amendments to the Criminal Code made in 2007 which identify 
electronic payment instruments as possible objects of crime provided opportunities for their wider interpretation, 
extending the notion of an electronic payment instrument to include both corporeal and non-corporeal means of 
payment. This aspect is of particular importance in view of the fact that Directive 2019/713 aims at entrenching 
the non-corporeal nature of payment instruments in criminal law. In view of the fact that today’s judicial practice 
interprets the notion of payment instruments in accordance with the comparatively broad and technologically 
neutral definition laid down in the Law on Payments, Article 214 of the Criminal Code will continue to be 
applicable to future technologies as the payment instrument remains identifiable not by its form, but by its 
functioning as a means of payment (i.e. it provides the possibility to transfer money or monetary value or to 
initiate a payment operation).   
 
Having analysed the provisions of Directive 2019/713, one can note several relevant aspects in the context of 
criminal responsibility for the illegal disposal of electronic payment instruments. For instance, criminal 
responsibility should be primarily provided for the illegal disposal of payment instruments subject to special 
protection against counterfeiting and misappropriation. In view of this, the issuance of specially protected 
payment instruments should be encouraged (Preamble, paragraph 12). Since an instrument is only deemed as a 
payment instrument on the condition that it actually ensures the possibility of initiating and completing a payment 
operation, “unlawfully obtaining a mobile payment application without the necessary authorisation should not be 
considered as an unlawful obtainment of a non-cash payment instrument as it does not actually enable the user to 
transfer money or monetary value” (Preamble, paragraph 8). Such conditions are relevant in regard to criminal 
law as an ultima ratio remedy. Criminal acts involving the illegal disposal of specially protected payment 
instruments that can actually initiate and complete a financial operation may be qualified in accordance with the 
objective criteria as gravely dangerous, and seriously threatening the financial system. Consequently, criminal 
penalties may be inflicted upon individuals for such acts. Finally, as Directive 2019/713 lays down, sanctions 
should not be imposed for the legal use of the payment instrument (Preamble, paragraph 13). The judicial practice 
of Lithuania’s Supreme Court maintains that criminal responsibility, provided for in Article 214 of the Criminal 
Code, can only be inflicted for the  
unlawful acquisition, storage, transfer or handling of payment instrument verification data sufficient to initiate 
a financial operation. It is also important in this respect that in the presence of consent by the owner or an 
authorized user of the payment instrument to specific acts of a third party (e.g. to the use of the payment 
instrument for the purpose of a limited sum financial operation), such acts of the third party are not usually 
deemed illegal under Article 214 of the Criminal Code (Lithuania's Supreme Court ruling of 24 March 2020 in 




It can be concluded that Lithuania’s legal acts define a payment instrument in line with the principle of neutrality, 
with no discrimination between issuers – comprising all possible financial institutions and including a wide range 
of payment instruments. However, the problem of identifying specific payment instruments is still frequently 
encountered in practice. As a result, the concept of an electronic payment instrument as an object of a crime is not 
strictly defined in Lithuania’s Criminal Code, leaving enough space for its wide interpretation. The 
technologically neutral nature of Lithuania’s legislation has ensured the opportunity for an electronic payment 
instrument to be identified in criminal law not by its form, but according to the functions it performs.    
 
During recent decades, conventional payment instruments have transformed considerably to become completely 
different from their former equivalents in terms of their form and their system. Today’s instant electronic 
payments are done by means of completely novel payment instruments, where personalized safety data are no 
longer stored in IC cards as they have been replaced by smart devices such as mobile phones, smart watches, and 
bracelets. In the context of criminal law, these new types of instruments may be acknowledged as electronic 
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payment systems, and as the object of a crime where the act in question indicates the intentional illegal disposal of 
a specially protected payment instrument that can initiate and complete a financial operation. At the same time, it 
is essential to prove that the culprit had the direct intention to misappropriate the item specifically as a means of 
payment.   
 
Directive PDS2 aims to extend the use of user-friendly payment instruments and encourages the development of 
easy-access, user-friendly payment instruments integrated into mobile or wearable devices. Despite this, 
Lithuania’s judicial practice, particularly in criminal law, is often faced with the specific practical problem of the 
identification of such instruments, as they are often mistaken for ordinary items because of a failure to identify the 
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